

Laura C t lina PA CU
Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Ia i
Faculty of Philosophy and Social-Political Sciences
PhD Researcher, POSDRU/159/1.5/S/132400 - “Young successful researchers
- professional development in an international and interdisciplinary environment”

NEW ACTORS IN GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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Abstract

International Development Assistance (IDA) architecture is rapidly changing and becoming more complex as new providers of assistance enter the scene. These new providers of assistance, while not members of the traditional club of donors, nonetheless make meaningful contributions, both financial and in-kind, to key development and humanitarian challenges.

New providers of assistance such as the BRICS countries - Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa – or Turkey, South Korea, are important for international assistance not only because of their financial and human resources, but also for the value they bring as regional leaders in their respective parts of the globe and contribute with their own unique experience and success in addressing development challenges at home as well as how best to cooperate with traditional donors.

Introduction

Globalization creates a new framework in security and international relations also force the energy security to assumed newfound geopolitical importance at the outset of the twenty-first century. Diminishing fossil fuel supplies have led to fears of energy shortages, while rapid economic and population growth have fueled the demand for cheap, clean and secure sources of energy. The provision of reliable and affordable energy, once the domain of domestic policy, has emerged as a key concern of foreign policymakers.

Interdependence of global development - international relations - economic diplomacy was highlighted in this paper work, where I presented comparative analytical perspectives on the new dimensions in international cooperation for assistance. The case study underlines the importance of the socio-economic and foreign policy on the conformation and capabilities of this geopolitical area in the context of the current financial and economic crisis has revived the game between the „Great Powers” and put on stage the „Emerging Powers”.

The Russian Federation (Russia) has come back to the international arena as a emergent power thanks to its oil and gas revenues and the leadership of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. An assertive Russian superpower has adopted a tough anti-Western stance in its external security policy against both NATO’s expansion towards the East and against the deployment of the US missile shield program in Europe.

Under Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, Russia has developed from a neglected regional power into a self-declared resurgent superpower. The basis for Moscow’s forceful come-back to the international arena has been the inflow of enormous oil and gas revenues as a result of swiftly rising world prices. The Russian Federation is an important part at the Soviet superpower and its close ties with the upcoming new powers of China and India had have served as a springboard for regaining an influential status in the world.

Russian oil and natural gas industries are increasingly important players in the global energy market, particularly in Europe and Eurasia. Russia has by far the largest natural gas reserves in the world and is the second-largest oil producer and is eighth in the world in reserves. Another key trend has been the concentration of these industries in the hands of the Russian government in the past decade. At the same time, trade in energy resources has the potential to usurp pre-existing economic or cultural ties to create new geopolitical alignments and alliances.

The main objective of this paper work is to present and analyze comparative perspective both theoretical and descriptive, but especially

from a historical and systemic functional perspective, the existence to a structural dynamic interdependency between the Russian Federation and geopolitical changing in the context of globalization. A second objective focused on the identification and implementation of internationally active role of identity and continuity elements of the environment and international development assistance system, with emphasis on the importance of new donors, such as the Russian Federation (Russia) tries to break away from its role mainly regional, as Soviet heritage.

The complex process of globalization and post-Cold War geopolitical changes was analyzed in the first part of this article and I underlined the importance of size and perspective features that define the return on international political and economic scene of the Russian Federation. The second part is focused on emphasizing the transformation of Russia from the donor vessel development in the context of a regional interconnection imperative of the emerging powers assistance with the overall development assistance and cooperation.

Globalization and Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe

Globalization is often described as a process: steadily progressing over time, pervasively spreading over space, and clearly inevitable in its development. But globalization is also a revolution, one of the most profound revolutions the world has ever known. Indeed, globalization is the first truly world revolution. All revolutions disrupt the traditions and customs of a people, indeed, they threaten a people’s very security, safety, and even identity. The world revolution that is globalization in some measure threatens the security of every people on the globe (Bari, 2010, p.72).

Globalization is therefore by no means a process which moulds all the cultures which meet within its dynamic into a single homogeneous whole. Indeed it is equally plausible to claim the contrary, globalization may bring about the unpacking of local cultural complexes, but in the process it creates multifarious local identities and cross-crossing frontiers, so that diversity comes to rule more than ever before in local spaces, even while similarities and links across social and spatial distances also become ever more evident (Held, 2004, p.20).

Globalization was described as the process in which the world is increasingly defined by a common activity. It refers to the extent to which wars, trade, culture, and many other aspects of life, are becoming globally inter-related. It is also a matter of a change in consciousness. People in business, politics, culture, and many other activities are thinking and acting in a global world. Within

that process, territoriality is having less significance (Stiglitz, 2008, pp. 24-25).

The core of globalization is that there is increasing inter-dependence. What happens in one part of the world affects what happens elsewhere. Some people have seen the term “globalization” as a cover for a Westernizing process. Many people, who see globalization as undesirable, see it as a process in which Western capitalism is dominating the world (Martin, Schumann, 1999, p. 21).

Many voices believe that as globalization extends, so extends the power of the Western corporate giants and the nations which harbor them. Together, they keep the Western world rich at the expense of the poverty of many other parts of the world. They dictate the trading terms, the interest rates, and the dominance of highly-mechanized production. They point to the ways in which great businesses are re-working the genetic make-up of economy so that are dependent in purchasing their business from the multi-national companies (Zakaria, 2009, p.11).

The events of September 11th in New York and Washington put the globalization of culture high on the agenda, but it was also seen as a protest against Western attempts to globalize its culture, to impose its particular set of values and attitudes on the rest of the world.

The Cold War structured Europe’s geopolitics for four decades. The Berlin Wall became the symbol of the Cold War. It made visible the divide between the Atlantic Alliance and the Soviet Gulag. It was a physical distinction between „friend” and „foe”, between the „Free World” and the „Evil Empire” (Tunander, 1997, p. 5).

It was a line drawn in the sand of Central Europe, a symbolic axe forced into the body of Europe. The Berlin Wall reflected the geopolitical conflict of the second half of the 20th century, just as the city wall reflected the geopolitical distinction of medieval Europe; and as the Chinese Great Wall made visible the conflict between the nomadic tribes in the North and the Chinese civilization in the south. The Wall, the physical distinction between one side and the other, is a sign of power, but it is also a physical expression of the conflict itself, recognizing the limits of dialogue and the limits of reason (Tunander, 1997, pp. 5-6).

With the fall of Berlin Wall, the ending of the old ideological division has facilitated peaceful solution and made dialogue a major instrument in solving conflicts. Reason seems to have become the apex of the new world order. Conversely, the geopolitical weight of strategic nuclear weapons and the weight of conflicting experiences and cultures seem to have transferred aspects of the old bipolarity and division into this new world (Kolodziej, 2007, p. 24).

After the collapse of the Soviet and Yugoslav states, the chaotic developments in the East created a new West European concern over its eastern frontier. From this perspective, Western Europe appears as an „island of peace”, a „fortified cosmos versus chaos with guarded gates”, also following this parallel, the new Western Europe appears as a “metaphorical city-state”, a “container of freedom” extending towards the East (Kolodziej, 2007).

The Russian Federation thinking, is more focused on the unity of culture, economic space and military geography, as if today’s Russian Eurasianists just wish to continue the Eurasian Continental project. From this perspective, each „Great Power”, with its political culture, economic space and sphere of political and military influence, defines its own *Grossraum*, its political union (B descu, 2004, p. 352).

In the post-Cold War Era, the Continental geopolitical discussion seems to have reappeared, not only with the reintroduction of cultural divides—a “clash of civilizations” , but also with the recognition of centralized structures of not fully sovereign states. The European Union (EU) is not primarily looked upon as a union of sovereign states that could possibly develop into a federal state, but as something in between. These in-between structures are based on cultural identity and political-economic competition rather than on political-military conflict, Edward Luttwak has characterized this new phenomenon as “geoeconomic” (V t man, 2009, p. 10).

The EU, the United States and the emerging power are not in competition militarily, but economically, or possibly, global transnational companies are using the states and these centralized economic-political structures to their own ends. Global media and economic transnational forces have made borders more transparent and territory less sacred – the power of the economic and political networks has in some cases replaced the power of the states.

The post-Cold War emphasis on economic rather than military power has been translated into a focus on centrality, on access to the decision-making centers, not on the rural less developed periphery, are not primarily on territorial control. The appearance of new “battle zones”, however, has once again raised the question of territorial control, the need for a military divide, the need to raise and move a “metaphorical wall” up to border of the „other”. The Berlin Wall separated two ideologies, two contradictory perspective about the future “good society” – the liberal and the Communist utopia – while today’s conflicts seem once again to delineate a medieval West-Rome/East-Rome divide separating the Western democracy, modernity and state power, with roots in the Roman tradition, from Eastern Orthodoxy,

swinging between autocracy and chaos, seemingly confirming the hypothesis “clash of civilizations” advanced by Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 1998, pp.159-160).

International Assistance – A Global Role for Development

Since the late 1950s at least, a particular classification of countries, a dichotomous distinction between *developed* and *developing*, has been dominant within the development business and prominent in other domains: the mass media; diplomacy; school curricula. In addition to *developed* and *developing*, we have *developed* and *underdeveloped*, *donor* and *recipient*, *North* and *South*, *First World* and *Third World*.

That dichotomous distinction, modified to acknowledge the existence at the time of a Second World of Communist countries with centrally-planned economies, dates back to the 1950s. There are two reasons why it became deeply embedded in language and thought in the 1950s and 1960s. First, it made empirical sense, most countries did seem to fall into one of three main groups – the First, Second or Third Worlds – as defined by both internal characteristics and patterns of external relations, and second, these basic divisions were acceptable or actively embraced by governments of countries within each category (Khanna, 2008, pp. 25-26).

They were convenient, usable for political and diplomatic purposes and, among other things, consistent with the development, the geopolitical and security concerns and policies of the main Western/First World aid donors. We all agree that there is no longer a distinctive Second World of Communist-ruled, centrally-planned economies (Khanna, 2008, p. 27).

Two points about that follow almost automatically from the fact that the old groupings have become more differentiated. First, it is unlikely that any one simple new classification of countries into two, three or four groups will prove to be useful for a wide range of policy purposes. Second, in this new world where the political map is more diverse and pluralistic, there are fewer chances that any one way of classifying countries will be useful to a wide range of governments and other policy actors (Harris, Moore, Schmitz, 2009, p. 9).

In order to understand the currently prevailing language it helps to go back to the tripartite classification of countries that began to emerge at the end of the 1940s as a result of the Cold War. The countries within each cluster had a great deal in common not only in terms of the attributes of their individual political and economic systems, but also in respect of how they related

politically and economically to the rest of the world (Nicholson, 1998, pp. 54-55).

The tripartite classification was politically convenient for governments. The governments of the First and Second Worlds embraced a language that signaled a struggle between their two very different systems and ideologies. The governments of the Third World, many of them having enjoyed independence only in the early and middle of 1960s. This “Third World” label was acceptable to the foreign policy and defense agencies of First World governments, as well as to their emerging foreign aid organizations. Competition with the Communist Second World for political influence was the dominant foreign policy concern in relation to the rest of the world.

The original justifications for the emergence of large foreign aid programs from developed to developing were shaped by perceptions of the successful Marshall Plan transfer of American capital to Western Europe after World War Two. However, the aid relationship expanded, both practically and in terms of the ways in which it was represented, to other areas in addition to the channeling of capital and technical assistance, to include general guidance and injunctions about economic policy, public policy generally, and modes of governance (Goldstein, Pevehouse, 2008).

Developed countries variously represented as being able to provide to developing countries:

- Public sector (aid) capital;
- Private sector (investment) capital;
- Expertise in managing the development process;
- Strong bilateral linkages, understanding and influence
- Collective influence over international and global institutions and organizations to be behalf of developing countries (Harris, Moore, Schmitz, 2009, p. 12).

The bases of the tripartite (First, Second, Third World) and dichotomous (developed–developing countries; donor–recipient countries) classifications were never as static as is implied by the image in table (see Table 1).

The disappearance of the category of Second World and centrally-planned economies is not a major concern in its own right. It matters to the extent that it contributes to our major story: the blurring of the differences between developed and developing countries such that the old labels are now rarely a useful way of summarizing either the structural characteristics of national economies or the patterns of interaction between countries (Gilpin, 2004, p. 223).

The delivery of aid can at best assist countries in mobilizing their efforts to address challenges. Development cooperation should thus not be regarded as the one and only silver bullet to

global problems. It is somewhat like providing risk capital, aid will work in some cases and not in others and Official Development Assistance (ODA) is only a tiny fraction of global financial flows, additional to private capital flows.

Developing countries are increasingly differentiating; some countries are new stars, others are starting from a completely different basis due to conflicts or failed government policies. Accordingly, donors will have to think how to differentiate goals and instruments in international co-operation. These vary across different types of countries for instance:

- **the poorest countries** - Least Developed Countries, with substantial capacity constraints;
- **the fragile or failed states** - with de facto non-existent internal or external sovereignty;
- **The emerging powers** - the "BRICS"- Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Grimm, 2008, p. 3).

The clearest examples of this new type of "poor and powerful", now "emerging power" country are India and China. Globalization has stimulated a greater degree of economic specialization, often evident at the national level, which induces more differentiation within, in particular, the old category of "developing countries".

Today, the importance of development assistance is nowadays one of key methods for building a country's international position. It combines the carrying out of foreign policy objectives, soft power activities, and the promotion of defined political rules, good governance, and the fulfillment of the commitments made by richer countries towards poorer countries (Dobrescu, 2010, pp. 19-20).

Development assistance has both practical, measured by increased political and economic influences, and prestige aspects. The provision of development assistance also serves the purposes of actions undertaken in the donor's country such as the strengthening of the non-governmental sector, which is responsible for delivering a large part of aid, the promotion of business, and awareness raising of global issues in society.

After the end of the cold war development assistance was monopolized by Western countries. These countries, grouped together in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), until the mid-2000s accounted for 95% of the funding allocated for development purposes (Smith, Zimmermann, 2010).

The DAC has also become one of the sources of concepts and rules regulating Official Development Assistance (ODA). The DAC countries opted for conditionality of provided

assistance, making aid dependent on the implementation of political and economic transformations. At the same time, attempts were made to separate development assistance from strategic objectives of foreign policy, by promoting divorcing development aid from immediate benefits or by using grants instead of loans (Smith, Zimmermann, 2010).

With the appearance of new centers of economic growth, other countries, from emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa, through EU new member. With the arrival of new sources of funding development assistance, its objectives and principles have started changing; also development assistance provided by new donors has several characteristics:

- it is focused on the region in the immediate vicinity (Russia – CIS states, China – Asia, India – its neighboring countries; Brazil – Latin American countries; it is also similar for Turkey and for South Korea);
- new donors shift away from the principle of conditionality and underline non-interference with the recipient country's internal affairs;
- new donors development assistance often provides a way of winning political influence and access to strategic resources (China's policy towards Africa);
- Promotes co-operation on an equal footing (South-South co-operation) (Lundsgaarde, 2011).

New donor countries are presenting a challenge to the already established development assistance system dominated by Western countries, despite the fact that their contribution is under fifteen per cent of global development assistance.

The aid granted by them often runs contrary to the principles developed by Western countries, such as the realization above all of the interests of the beneficiaries and not of the donor, the separation from direct benefits, harmonization between donors and is also perceived as supporting authoritarian regimes and lowering standards.

In 2010, Official Development Assistance (ODA) altogether about US\$ 130 billion. The largest donor countries are the US with US\$ 30 billion and the EU with US\$ 70 billion. In comparison, the aid provided by China stood at US\$ 2.5 billion, by India at US\$ 1 billion, by Turkey at approximately US\$ 1 billion and by Poland at US\$ 380 million (Smith, Zimmermann, 2010).

The ideological platforms of national ODA also vary, not all countries have special development agencies, also, specialized development agencies in different countries are subordinated to different ministries, depending on

ideology. World experience of involving business in national International Development Assistance (IDA) programs has a history and the trend has recently been developed by the "new donors".

The Russian Federation in Global Development Cooperation: Case Study

A New International Actor. Since the end of the Cold War, post-Soviet Russia has experienced a profound crisis of strategic identity. Previously a self-sufficient and autonomous international actor, post-Soviet Russia not only had to rethink its domestic political and economic organizational model in depth, but also had to confront the most significant transformation of its surrounding strategic environment in the past five centuries.

Russia was challenged not only by the losses of strategically pivotal terrestrial and maritime strongholds, and the rise of powerful actors in its immediate vicinity, but also faced profound changes in the entire international political framework with blurred prospects for the future world order. With the end of the rivalry between the two global superpowers and the intensification of the globalization phenomena, Russia had to develop a non-conflictual identity, which would guarantee a smooth and rapid adaptation to a new external environment (Gray, 2010, p. 259).

Again, as was the case on numerous occasions in history, Russia was at a crossroads. During the so-called "time of troubles" in Russia, the role of the leader became increasingly prominent, with almost all citizens expecting a "strong hand" that would put an end to the internal chaos and make other great powers respect Russia.

In practical terms, this means a "conservative change" later translated into the restoration of the famous power vertical, the taking over of competitive private enterprises by state companies, maintenance of natural monopolies as economic and political instruments of government, reform of armed forces, social protection system, banking and financial sectors. Russia's internal agenda represents a constitutive part of a plan designated to reclaim the great power status on the international arena (Secrieru, 2008, p. 110).

Therefore, the current administration considers that the re-establishment of Russia's greatness is possible through the maximization of traditional factors of might, by appealing to new sources of economic power. This synthetic approach has to propel Russia into the core club of states (G8) in the international system whose policies are vital for global security and world economic evolution. The basic foreign policy document specifies that the geopolitical position of Russia as one of the largest Eurasian powers

predetermines Russia's responsibility for maintaining security in the world both on global and regional level. In other words, Russia is viewed now as a regional superpower, and one with global potential in world politics (Ivanov, 2003, pp. 22-23).

The Russian Federation as Donor - Soviet Heritage. Participation of the USSR in Development Assistance began soon after Nikita Khrushchev came to power in 1953, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) became very active in delivering assistance to developing countries driven mostly by ideological interests. This trend lasted until the end of the Cold War, when the USSR had to dramatically cut down its development aid.

Most of this aid, called "economic cooperation" was politically driven and aimed at supporting countries with similar ideological leanings to that of the Soviets. Acting as a donor, the USSR demonstrated to political elites of developing countries that they no longer needed to turn to their former colonial powers in order to satisfy their development needs—all necessary resources could be received from the socialistic camp (Bari, 2010, p. 177).

The goal of Soviet assistance was to urge Third World countries to move toward a non-capitalist path of development. By investing considerable resources into large industrial projects of national importance, Soviet leaders aimed at creating a base for the "peaceful transfer" of developing countries to socialism and assisting them to reproduce the Soviet model of industrialization. In addition, economic assistance from the Soviet Union supported a favorable environment for the supply of Soviet arms and a channel for strategic natural resources. This "economic cooperation" was coordinated by the State Committee for External Economic Affairs, a body created in 1957 expressly for this purpose (Hart, 1998, 321).

All development assistance commitments made by the USSR were secured in bilateral agreements for scientific-technological and economic cooperation. Soviet representatives specified the following instruments types of "economic cooperation" from the USSR to developing countries:

- Concessional loans with grants comprising more than 25 percent ;
- Grants;
- Assignment of Soviet specialists to developing countries;
- Education of staff from developing countries in the USSR;
- Provision of technologies and know-how;
- Price subsidies for goods exported to developing countries (fixed prices);

- Subsidized marine cargo transfers (Korepanov, Komagaeva, 2012, p. 11).

Based on official criteria for ODA formulated later by OECD/DAC, less than half of the assistance delivered by the USSR to developing countries could be formally considered ODA. About sector priorities for Soviet Assistance Economic cooperation with developing countries consisted primarily of large construction projects of national importance. These projects were implemented in various sectors of heavy industry, nonferrous and ferrous metallurgy (metallurgical works in India, Iran, Egypt, and Algeria), machinery construction (Guinea), electric power (Aswan Hydro Electro Station in Egypt and Euphrates Hydro Complex in Syria), fossil fuels and raw materials industry in many Second World countries (Korepanov, Komagaeva, 2012, pp. 13-14).

Development assistance from the USSR had a strong geographic focus, based on bilateral relations with three main groups of aid recipients: 1. members of CAER - Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; 2. Socialist-oriented countries in Africa, Asia, South America, also in the Middle East; 3. Strategically located non-socialistic countries (India, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey) (Oatley, 2010, p. 115).

The USSR never provided official statistics on its international assistance and with negative trends in the Soviet economy in the early 1980s, the USSR became more skeptical toward economic cooperation with developing countries. By 1991, the Russian Federation had practically stopped its assistance funding, basically it also transformed from a donor into a recipient of foreign aid.

Russia from Recipient to Emerging Donor. In the 1990s, the former Soviet Union republics and other Central and Eastern European countries with economies in transition were included in the second part of the OECD - DAC list, thereby officially branding them as aid recipients. Russia started receiving international development assistance upon its inception as a sovereign country in 1991, but continued contributing to international assistance. The Russian Federation maintained its participation in humanitarian operations, made regular contributions to international organizations, participated in debt relief toward loans provided by the USSR, and was one of the leaders in the world in providing grants to foreign students (Shapovalova, 2011).

At the same time, Russia's participation in development assistance remained rather insignificant with respect to volumes and forms of assistance. The situation began to change over the past decade when the amount of Russia's development aid started growing from year to year, the forms of aid delivery started to diversify,

and a new national system of development aid started taking shape. In 2005, the OECD decided to give up the second part of the DAC list the list of "more advanced" recipient countries. Since then, assistance rendered to Russia and countries of Central and Eastern Europe, most of which entered the European Union between 2004 and 2007, was no longer counted by OECD as official assistance (Rakhmangulov, 2010, p. 51).

Russia's contribution to international assistance grew significantly in the area of debt relief to poor nations. Several factors influenced the reemergence of Russia as a donor country. A favorable macro-economic situation based upon sustainable economic growth strengthened Russia's financial position; changes in the emphasis of Russian foreign policy also had a notable impact; after 2000, Russia focused on strengthening its position in the international arena in part by increasing its participation in international organizations. The government started positioning Russia as a "rising country" and a responsible and reliable international player (Korepanov, Komagaeva, 2012, pp. 14-15).

The Concept document entitled "Russia's Participation in International Development Assistance" became key in the reemergence of Russia as a donor country. The only officially published programmatic document so far, the Concept articulated key goals, principles, and priorities for Russia on international development. The Concept prioritizes reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), stresses the importance of coordinating Russian aid with development assistance activities of other bilateral and multilateral donors, and expects the government to develop its plans for international assistance in ways that involve academia, civil society, and the private sector.

Russia's regional priorities are one of the main factors of its international development assistance system. One of the regional priorities is multidimensional cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, with the focus on the members of the Agreement on the Integrated Economic Space (IES) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and strengthening integration processes within the CIS. Regional priorities of the Russian Federation also include cooperation with Latin America, Middle East and North African countries (White, 2011, p. 12).

As part of this, Russia's chairmanship of the Group of Eight (G8) in 2006 played a very important role in the reemergence of Russia as a donor country. Its role as a new development partner in the international arena for other members of the G8 became especially visible through participation in commitments around increases in overseas development assistance.

Now Russia is emerging as a “new” emerging donor. This group includes non-DAC OECD members, new European Union countries which are not members of the OECD, Middle East and OPEC countries, and non-OECD donors that do not belong to any of the previous groups, including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS).

Conclusions

The original rationale for development policy in general and IDA or ODA organizations in particular was that there was a developing world which needed help from the developed world. But the division of the world into developed and developing countries no longer makes sense. Some developing countries have experienced the fastest sustained economic growth in history. Others have declined or fallen apart. In many cases, the relationships between countries have changed so much that the distinction between donor countries and recipient countries hinders understanding.

In its attempts to catch up with the global trend, Russia began granting development assistance in 2004. In its commitment to development co-operation Russia has sought on the one hand to increase its prestige on the international stage and on the other hand to gain another instrument of exerting its ascendancy in the CIS.

The scale of aid and the way of delivering it have not made Russia an important global actor. The resources dedicated to this end stand at a mere 0.035% of Russian GDP. Unlike other non-Western superpowers such as China or India, Russia is not a competitor for Western countries in this area on the global scale.

In my opinion, the CIS space and specially Central Asia, is and will remain, critical for Russia's reassertion of external greatness and because it serves as an interface with the outside world, preponderance here provides Moscow with a greater leverage over the regional power equilibriums across Eurasia, in fact string position in the ex-Soviet periphery, had have to prevent a hostile encirclement and guarantee Russia's strategic global role for itself in the world.

Nevertheless, within the CIS, Russia's aid is building the country's position as a donor. The long-term results of this aid are however being counteracted by the fact that Russia is expecting measurable and direct political and economic benefits in return. Although this policy helps Russia achieve its objectives in the CIS, to develop Russian potential in the sphere of soft power and to create a positive image of the country in global development.

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Annexes

Dimensions	First World (developed)	Second World	Third World (developing)
Internal features			
Political system	Liberal democracy	Single-party Communist rule	Mixed; rarely democratic
Economic system	Market oriented	Centrally-planned	Variable
Income level	High	Mixed;generally medium	Low
Economic growth rate	High	Mixed	Low
External features			
Main trading partners	Other First World countries	Other Second World countries	First World countries
Geopolitical relationship to other Worlds	Geopolitical competition with Second World; colonial power over, aid donor too and dominant over of Third World	Geopolitical competition with First World;aid donor too and influential in parts of Third World	Aid recipient; subordinate;
Influence in main international economic institutions	High	Low	Low

Table 1. First, Second and Third World (1950 ~ 1970). (processed data).